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Marriage on the Ballot: An Analysis of
Same-Sex Marriage Referendums in North
Carolina, Minnesota, and Washington During
the 2012 Elections
Craig M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins*
INTRODUCTION
Using direct democracy, voters in a majority of states have
considered, in recent years, whether the definition of marriage
should include or exclude same-sex couples. This Article explores
how individuals assessed three ballot measures that defined
marriage in three states: two constitutional referendums that
proposed to outlaw same-sex marriage in North Carolina and
Minnesota, and a veto referendum that asked voters to affirm a
legislative action that legalized same-sex marriage in
Washington state. We explore what individuals knew about the
referendums and whether elite endorsements helped them make
what Lupia and McCubbins termed “reasoned choices” on these
ballot measures.1 We find that, despite the simplicity of the
measures, knowledge about them was generally poor. We also
show that individuals sometimes, but by no means universally,
use elite endorsements to inform their decisions. When
individuals use elite endorsements, the individual must perceive
the cue-giver to be knowledgeable and trustworthy. We also
discover knowing a gay or lesbian person is sometimes related to
voters’ decisions about whether to support or oppose same-sex
marriage. Our results have broad implications for how
individuals form their evaluations of social policy in the United
States and how these evaluations translate into votes. We
conclude by considering what our findings mean for direct
democracy from both a legal and policy perspective.
Since 1998, voters in thirty-six states have considered the
question of whether to outlaw or allow same-sex couples to marry
* Craig M. Burnett (craig.burnett@hofstra.edu), Assistant Professor of Political
Science at Hofstra University. Mathew D. McCubbins (mathew.mccubbins@duke.edu),
Ruth F. De Varney Professor of Political Science and Professor of Law at Duke University.
1 See generally ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC
DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (James E. Alt & Douglass C.
North eds., 1998) [hereinafter LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA].
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a total of forty times.2 Until the 2012 elections in Maine,
Maryland, and Washington, citizens had not yet voted to legalize
same-sex marriage at the ballot box. In June 2015, the United
States Supreme Court decided in Obergefell v. Hodges that bans
on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional.3 While the basic
right of same-sex marriage is now decided, issues related to
same-sex marriage as a social policy—for example, whether
public figures can opt out of performing marriages based on their
religious beliefs or whether businesses must cater to same-sex
couples—will continue to be matters considered both in the
courts and on the ballot. Despite the often-contentious nature of
the issue—and the sometimes astronomical spending for or
against these measures—research using individual-level data to
analyze how individuals make decisions concerning same-sex
marriage is limited.
In what represents some of the only individual-level data
that explores how voters decided these social policy questions,
our previous research on same-sex marriage4 examines an exit
survey of California voters regarding Proposition 8—the highly
contentious and notably expensive constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage in California that was later
overturned by the United States Supreme Court.5 Our results
reveal that most voters knew very little about the measure.
Those who knew and trusted one of the political parties’
endorsements, however, were likely to use that cue to arrive at a
decision. This finding supports the theory of persuasion,
learning, and choice that Lupia and McCubbins proposed.6 By
contrast, voters’ knowledge of specific facts about the measure
had a negligible effect on their decisions.
Our previous results, while novel and interesting, suffer
from a relatively small sample size.7 Moreover, due to the exit
2 Two states—Arizona and California—considered outlawing marriage twice; Maine
rejected a law via referendum to allow same-sex marriage, but then passed an initiative
to legalize same-sex marriage. H.R. 1860, 125th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2012). Nevada’s
constitution dictates that voters must consider (and pass) any constitutional change in
two subsequent elections. NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2.
3 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
4 For our analysis on voting behavior on California’s Proposition 8 in 2008, see
generally Craig M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box: Perception
of Ballot Measures Regarding Same-Sex Marriage and Abortion in California, 34 J. PUB.
POL’Y 3 (2014) [hereinafter Burnett & McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box].
5 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
6 For a formal explanation of their model and expectations, see LUPIA
& MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 17–39.
7 See Craig M. Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett, & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Dilemma
of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J.: RULES, POL., & POL’Y 305, 305–14 (2010)
[hereinafter Burnett et al., Dilemma of Direct Democracy] (analyzing voting behavior on
California’s Proposition 7, showing that usage of cues is quite limited); see also Burnett
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survey format of these studies, we were unable to ask more than
a few questions about the ballot measures we surveyed. Indeed,
our research on Proposition 8 likely raises more questions than
answers,8 including:
1. How often do voters use endorsements to arrive at an
informed decision on ballot measures?
2. Is our finding that knowledge of facts has a limited impact
on decisions idiosyncratic to Proposition 8, or is this a
general finding?
3. Given the relatively low levels of knowledge about policy
specifics and endorsements, how do the majority of voters
arrive at decisions?
While we cannot definitively approach an answer to the third
question, we endeavor to provide some analysis on the other two
questions with additional data. Using survey data from three
states that considered outlawing or adopting same-sex marriage
during the 2012 election cycle, we again examine the degree to
which individuals’ knowledge of prominent endorsements and
pertinent policy facts influence their decisions. Taking our lead
from Lupia,9 and his work with McCubbins,10 we explore the
hypothesis that individuals use information to arrive at a
reasoned decision. Unlike our previous research, we have
gathered significantly more in-depth data to provide greater
insight into how voters make decisions about whether to legalize
or outlaw same-sex marriage in their state. As in our previous
research, we find that individuals do not use cues from
prominent third-party endorsers at a high rate. We also show
that factual knowledge has a limited effect on decisions.
We argue that the results we present here represent a
unique and instructive test case of the Lupia and McCubbins
hypothesis, as same-sex marriage is the prototypical “easy issue”
for which most individuals can arrive at a decision armed with
little more than their gut instinct.11 In other words, we expect
& McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4, at 11 (finding wide recognition of
Governor Schwarzenegger’s endorsement in a study of several Indian gaming compacts);
Craig M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Common Wisdom Is Neither Common
nor Wisdom: Exploring Voters’ Limited Use of Endorsements on Three Ballot Measures, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1557, 1561–69 (2013) [hereinafter Burnett & McCubbins, Voters’ Limited
Use of Endorsements].
8 Burnett & McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4, at 10–12.
9 See generally Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and
Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994)
[hereinafter Lupia, Shortcuts] (showing that voters make reasonably informed decisions
on insurance reform initiatives).
10 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 35–38.
11 For what constitutes an “easy issue,” see Edward G. Carmines & James A.
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that same-sex marriage is the least likely place to find support
for the Lupia and McCubbins hypothesis.12 In addition to
estimating the effect of endorsements and facts, we also provide
some traction on the third question by gauging the effect that
personal relationships have on decisions. In particular, we find
that knowing a gay or lesbian person can have a large effect on
the individuals’ decision calculus.
Not only do these findings have both important normative
and legal implications, we suspect that our results will be
informative regarding how voters will behave on related issues in
future elections. That is, while the basic policy of marriage is
decided, it is likely that same-sex marriage will follow a similar
policy path that abortion did post Roe v. Wade.13 The battle of
same-sex marriage will likely shift to the policy margins, as
citizens, interest groups, and legislatures will attempt to shape
and reshape the boundaries of same-sex marriage as a policy.
I. VOTERS AND DECISION MAKING ON BALLOT MEASURES
Whether voters are equipped with the ability to make
political decisions in both representative and direct democracy
has been a subject of considerable debate among scholars and
political observers. For representative democracy, Converse’s
study of belief systems highlights the fact that most individuals
do not organize the world in terms of a liberal or conservative
ideology, and most individuals lack a meaningful understanding
of the ideological spectrum.14 The impact of Converse’s study
cannot be understated, as it became common wisdom that the
average voter’s inability to recall specific facts implies voters are
unprepared to make democratic decisions. Subsequent studies on
what voters know about politics have served to reinforce this
belief.15
In response to Converse’s findings, scholars interested in
voter decision making approached the question of competence
from a more practical vantage point. Notably, Brady and
Sniderman constructed a framework for understanding voters’

Stimson, The Two Faces of Issue Voting, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 78, 80 (1980).
12 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 205–08.
13 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14 Philip E. Converse, The Ideological Character of Mass Participation in American
Politics, in POLITICAL ISSUES AND BUSINESS IN 1964, at 11, 15 (Govert W. van den Bosch
ed., 1964) (finding that voters lack a strong understanding of the political world in a deep
analysis of American National Election Study data).
15 For a summary of what voters know about politics, see MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI
& SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62–104
(1996).
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decisions that differed substantially from Converse.16 They argue
that most individuals will rely on basic feelings of groups to help
them arrive at a decision, which they termed “likability
heuristics.” Their argument is that storing and recalling vast
amounts of knowledge to make a decision is often too difficult for
most individuals. Instead, basic feelings of like or dislike for a
group or person often lead to similar decisions as if the individual
were more informed.
Similar to Downs,17 Popkin’s classic work on heuristics
argues that simple cues—and especially party identification—
help voters arrive at a relatively informed decision without
investing much time or effort.18 Popkin argues that voters choose
to minimize the time required to arrive at a decision, but still
make decisions that are not all that different from a
fully-informed vote.19 Empirically, it is Lupia’s seminal research
on voters in Los Angeles during the 1988 general election that
examines this theory with survey data.20 Lupia’s survey shows
that voters who were aware of simple endorsements were able to
arrive at decisions that were indistinguishable from those who
were the most informed.
While the public’s use of party identification was largely a
foregone conclusion, Lupia’s results demonstrate that voters’ use
of cues beyond party identification is possible. Expanding on this
finding, Lupia and McCubbins identify the conditions under
which the significant result seen in Lupia can appear.21 Lupia
and McCubbins define two necessary conditions for a third-party
endorsement to be persuasive and demonstrate the conditionality
of persuasion in a novel set of laboratory experiments.22 First, an
16 See generally Henry E. Brady & Paul M. Sniderman, Attitude Attribution: A
Group Basis for Political Reasoning, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1061 (1985) (theorizing that
most individuals think about politics simplistically).
17 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 211 (1957) (arguing that
ignorance of specific facts is rational).
18 SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (2d ed. 1994) (expanding on the logic that ignorance is rational
and party identification helps voters cast reasoned votes despite their ignorance of
politics).
19 Id. at 7–15.
20 Lupia, Shortcuts, supra note 9, at 63, 72.
21 Id.; LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 98.
22 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 98. For additional
experimental research on this topic which confirms the Lupia and McCubbins finding, see
Cheryl Boudreau, Closing the Gap: When Do Cues Eliminate Differences Between
Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Citizens?, 71 J. POL. 964 (2009); Cheryl Boudreau,
Mathew D. McCubbins & Seana Coulson, Knowing When to Trust Others: An ERP Study
of Decision Making After Receiving Information from Unknown People, 4 SOC. COGNITIVE
& AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 23 (2009) [hereinafter Boudreau et al., ERP Study]; Mathew
D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Deliberating Improve Decisionmaking?,
15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9 (2006). For experimental results that match the Lupia
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individual must trust the cue-giver in order for an endorsement
to be persuasive. There are four requirements, which are
individually or jointly sufficient, for an individual who receives
an endorsement to trust the endorser.23 One means by which
someone trusts the statements made by someone else (who is a
stranger to them), is the Aristotelian maxim that the two are
perceived by each other to share a common interest in the
outcome of the individual’s choice. In terms of a vote on a ballot
measure, the endorser and the voter must desire the same
outcome. In the absence of a shared common interest, the
endorser can establish trust by taking an observable and costly
action to convey the information. Similarly, a penalty for lying or
the threat of outside verification of the endorser’s statement can
serve as external forces that substitute for the trust gained from
common interest.
The second condition is that the individual must perceive the
endorser as being knowledgeable about the decision at hand. Put
another way, if the endorser has no experience or knowledge that
is pertinent to the choice available—e.g., the hardware salesman
who is not particularly knowledgeable about cars offers his
advice about which car to purchase—the individual receiving the
endorsement will disregard the information as not useful.
By establishing these two conditions for persuasion, Lupia
and McCubbins make clear that a good number of endorsements
will not be persuasive.24 Indeed, Garrett and McCubbins find
that many third party endorsements fail to meet the two
conditions for persuasion,25 and Garrett and Smith uncover the

and McCubbins propositions, but do not test it directly, see generally GERD GIGERENZER,
ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD (Stephen Stich ed., 2000); GERD
GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (2007); GERD
GIGERENZER, RATIONALITY FOR MORTALS: HOW PEOPLE COPE WITH UNCERTAINTY
(Stephen Stich ed., 2008); GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US
SMART (Stephen Stitch ed., 1999); GERD GIGERENZER & REINHARD SELTEN, BOUNDED
RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (2001).
23 Lupia and McCubbins state a prior necessary condition: individual decision
makers must believe that they will learn something that enables them to improve the
outcome resulting from their decision, or else they will not pay attention to the
endorsement to begin with. Attention, and the belief that the decision maker can learn
from the statement of another, is assumed away in all other analyses of persuasion and
learning. LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 2. If, for example,
the individual is already confident in her choice, she will not seek or incorporate an
endorsement into her decision (more information is not always better, a new statement
could be erroneous, or confusing, thus making the decision maker worse off). Id. For an
experimental study of attention and persuasion, see Boudreau et al., ERP Study, supra
note 22.
24 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 7.
25 For an analysis of several cue-givers in direct democracy elections, see Elizabeth
Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters Make Laws: How Direct Democracy Is
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common practice of hiding the identity of the true endorsement
with an ambiguous front group name.26 In our own research, we
also call into question the degree to which voters use
endorsements to make decisions on ballot measures.27 Our
empirical findings are quite mixed, but consistent: endorsements
are influential on some people for some endorsements, and
knowledge of facts only matters some of the time.
While our surveys have raised important questions about the
degree to which voters actually use endorsements or knowledge
of facts, the results we have presented to date are still limited.
Our goal here is to expand on the empirical record concerning
both cues and factual information and how voters process
knowledge into decisions. The policy area we study is whether an
individual chooses to adopt or ban same-sex marriage—a policy
we have examined before.28 In addition to providing new data, we
ask more in-depth questions about what kinds of policy facts and
prominent endorsements individuals learn about, allowing us to
gauge what individuals know about these referendums that will
appear on their ballots just days later. We also include a measure
of whether or not they know a gay or lesbian person.
Unlike our previous research that examines other policy
areas, same-sex marriage is a relatively inhospitable
environment to look for the Lupia and McCubbins hypothesis to
have predictive power. Same-sex marriage is an archetypal “easy
issue” under the Carmines and Stimson framework.29 Same-sex
marriage has been on the political agenda for over fifteen years
and focuses on the ends, rather than the means. Thus, voters
who must consider these types of issues often have well-formed
opinions about the matter and can rely on a “gut reaction” to the
policy. Because easy issues, such as same-sex marriage
measures, typically do not require much in the way of policy
specifics, providing a reasoned answer often means the voter
needs “no conceptual sophistication.”30 For the Lupia and
McCubbins framework, we would predict that endorsements are
likely less persuasive. Many individuals will already have made
Shaping American Cities, 13 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 39 (2008).
26 See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295 (2005) (revealing, in an
examination of several groups listed in official support or opposition of ballot measures,
that most groups were constructed for just the one election and the names chosen were
largely uninformative, if not misleading).
27 See Burnett et al., Dilemma of Direct Democracy, supra note 7; Burnett
& McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4; Burnett & McCubbins, Voters’
Limited Use of Endorsements, supra note 7, at 1561.
28 Burnett & McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4, at 3, 10–12.
29 Carmines & Stimson, supra note 11, at 78.
30 Id.
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up their minds about the issue and, therefore, are not seeking
knowledge from an endorsement. Under these conditions,
endorsements will only be persuasive for a fraction of the
population.
In this research, we test two hypotheses that we derive from
the Lupia and McCubbins framework that sets parameters for
when third-party endorsements will be persuasive.31 Similar to
our previous research, we operationalize common interest—
which establishes trust—between an endorser and an individual
as being satisfied when the individual has a positive perception
of the endorser.32 We establish the knowledgeability condition by
only examining endorsers who have considerable expertise on the
question at hand.33 Consistent with the Lupia and McCubbins
framework, we explore the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who share a common
interest with a cue-giver will be more likely to accept the
cue-giver’s endorsement and vote in accordance with
that recommendation.
We also use the Lupia and McCubbins framework to derive a
second hypothesis about how third-party endorsements can
influence voters. In particular, we agree with Lupia and
McCubbins that an individual does not need to have a positive
perception of the endorser to extract information from an
endorsement. Indeed, Lupia and McCubbins argue that
sometimes the most informative endorsement comes from
endorsers with whom an individual disagrees.34 In other words,
an individual can use the recommendation from an endorser they
disagree with to learn to do the opposite, as they do not share a
common interest. Accordingly, our second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who are aware that they do
not share a common interest with a cue-giver will be
more likely to use the cue-giver’s endorsement and vote
in opposition to that recommendation.
We also examine two other relationships with our data.
First, similar to Lupia and others, we investigate whether
greater knowledge has an impact on an individual’s decision.35 In
See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 9.
Burnett & McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4, at 10–11.
We discuss this in further detail for each endorsement in the next section. See
infra Part II.
34 See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1.
35 See Lupia, Shortcuts, supra note 9, at 72. For an example of how increased
information can alter voting choices, see Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information
31
32
33
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our research, we focus on whether factual knowledge of policy
specifics influences an individual’s decision. Second, we explore
the degree to which personal relationships affect an individual’s
belief that same-sex marriage should be legal or not. Here, the
personal relationship we focus on is whether an individual knows
a gay or lesbian person. We do not define these two explorations
as formal hypotheses to test because, as we outline next, we
perceive these two variables to be covariates in our model, not
treatments.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
We examine our hypotheses using data we collected during
the 2012 election cycle. During the 2012 primary season, we
polled eligible voters in North Carolina about Amendment 1—a
legislatively-referred constitutional amendment that proposed to
outlaw same-sex marriage in the state.36 In the general election,
we asked registered voters in Minnesota and Washington about a
referendum in their respective state concerning same-sex
marriage. Minnesota’s Amendment 1 was a legislatively-referred
constitutional amendment that proposed to outlaw same-sex
marriage in the state.37 Washington’s Referendum 74 was a veto
referendum38 of a legislative statute that legalized same-sex
marriages.39 Thus, for North Carolina and Minnesota, voters in
these states were considering an amendment to the constitution
that would outlaw same-sex marriage; all constitutional
amendments in these states require voter approval.40 As a veto
referendum, Washington’s measure was citizen-initiated, in that
individuals gathered enough signatures to require the duly
passed legislation (a regular statute) authorizing same-sex
marriages to appear on the ballot for voter approval before being
enacted.41
We use a post-test-only non-equivalent group design to
explore our two hypotheses based on the Lupia and McCubbins
Effects in Presidential Elections, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1996).
36 North Carolina Same-Sex Marriage, Amendment 1 (May 2012), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/North_Carolina_Same-Sex_Marriage,_Amendment_1_(May_2012)
[http://perma.cc/FH4J-V3EN].
37 Minnesota Same-Sex Marriage Amendment, Amendment 1 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Minnesota_Same-Sex_Marriage_Amendment,_Amendment_1_(2012)
[https://perma.cc/WYR4-6VRF].
38 This may also be called a popular referendum.
39 Washington Same-Sex Marriage Veto Referendum, Referendum 74 (2012),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Same-Sex_Marriage_Veto_Referendum,_
Referendum_74_(2012) [perma.cc/J5X9-WRYG].
40 MINN. CONST. art. XI; N.C. CONST. art. XIII; WASH. CONST. art. XXIII.
41 See Washington Same-Sex Marriage Veto Referendum, Referendum 74 (2012),
supra note 39.
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model of when third-party endorsements will influence
outcomes.42 In a basic sense, our treatment is knowledge of an
endorsement. Knowledge of an endorsement, as we discussed
previously, is not sufficient for persuasion by itself. For the
endorsement to be persuasive, the individual must trust the
endorser by sharing a common interest or knowing that they do
not share a common interest (allowing for the individual to do the
opposite of the recommendation). Here, similar to Karp and our
own research, we establish trust between the individual and the
endorser by accounting for the interaction between knowledge of
an endorsement and the individual’s perception of the cue-giver
(positive or negative).43 Our first hypothesis states that
individuals who have knowledge of an endorsement and have a
positive perception of the endorser will be more likely to follow
the endorser’s suggestion in their vote choice. Likewise, our
second hypothesis states that individuals who have knowledge of
an endorsement but have a negative perception of the cue-giver
will be less likely to follow the cue-giver’s recommendation. To
model this relationship, we split our sample of respondents into
two groups: individuals who have a positive view of the endorser
and individuals who have a negative view of the endorser.
Separating the two types of individuals allows us the most
precise test of our hypotheses and minimizes the difference in
propensity to receive the treatment between the two groups. In
other words, if there is a difference in propensity to learn of an
endorsement based on an individual’s perception of the cue-giver,
we account for that variance by separating our respondents into
separate groups.
While we can account for the variance in the propensity to
receive the endorsement between groups by creating subgroups,
we still must account for the variance in propensity within
groups. Since we have a non-equivalent group design, we must
account for the discrepancies between the treatment group—i.e.,
learned of an endorsement—and the control group—i.e., did not
learn of an endorsement. We use the empirical strategy we
outlined in our previous research to construct equivalent
groups.44 Specifically, we use the GenMatch package for R as
implemented by MatchIt to construct equivalent treatment and

See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1.
See Burnett & McCubbins, Voters’ Limited Use of Endorsements, supra note 7, at
1575; Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns, in
CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 149 (Shaun Bowler
et al. eds., 1998) (showing that impact of an endorsement depends on an individual’s
evaluation of the endorser).
44 See Burnett & McCubbins, Voters’ Limited Use of Endorsements, supra note 7.
42
43
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control groups.45 Matching is a useful tool to reduce the covariate
imbalance between treatment and control groups. Unlike
experimental work in which the researcher can use random
assignment to achieve balance between the treatment and
control groups, researchers conducting observational or
quasi-experimental work have no control over the distribution of
the treatment among groups. Indeed, there are sound reasons to
expect that the treatment is not distributed evenly among the
treatment and control group. In our research, we know that
knowledge of endorsements is not randomly assigned to
individuals: people who are more interested in politics, better
educated, wealthier, and older are more likely to follow politics
and, as a result, learn from endorsements. Matching, then, finds
the best matches of individuals in the treatment group to the
control group. In a more practical sense, the genetic matching
algorithm produces a two-group sample of respondents who are
as similar as possible along important covariates. Matching,
combined with separating respondents into the two groups
described in the previous paragraph, creates a balance in the
propensity to receive the treatment for all relevant subgroups. In
each of our matching algorithms, we use the following
covariates: age, income, education, gender, party identification,
ideology, and political knowledge.46
After constructing equivalent groups, we use a logit
regression to estimate the effect of knowing an endorsement on
vote choice. A formal representation of this regression appears in
Equation 1.

45 For detailed descriptions on how GenMatch works, see Alexis Diamond & Jasjeet
Sekhon, Genetic Matching for Estimating Causal Effects: A General Multivariate
Matching Method for Achieving Balance in Observational Studies, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT.
932 (2013); Jasjeet Sekhon, Opiates for the Matches: Matching Methods for Causal
Inference, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 487 (2009). MatchIt is a package in R that implements
several matching algorithms. For a technical description of how to use the MatchIt
package, see Daniel E. Ho et al., Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing
Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 199 (2007).
46 Political knowledge for North Carolina’s Amendment 1 is an index of the
percentage of correct answers of the following six questions: (1) Whose responsibility is it
to determine if a law is constitutional or not; (2) Do you happen to know what job or office
Harry Reid currently holds; (3) How much of a majority of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate are required to override a presidential veto; (4) Do you
happen to know which party has the most members in the House of Representatives in
Washington, D.C.; (5) Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives;
and (6) Who is the current Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court? For
Minnesota’s Amendment 1 and Washington’s Referendum 74 there is an additional
question in the index: Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the
Senate in Washington, D.C.?
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Equation 1

Pr(yiz = 1) =

1+e

1
–(β 0 +β 1 Q iz +β 2 X iz )

In our logit regression, Pr(yiz = 1) represents the estimated
probability an individual voting in favor of supporting a ballot
measure; i denotes an individual in our survey; z represents the
ballot measure being analyzed. A binary choice, “1” represents a
“yes” vote and “0” is a “no” vote on ballot measure z. Next, Q is a
matrix of dichotomous variables that signifies whether an
individual had knowledge of an endorsement for ballot measure
z. The model’s final term is X, which is a matrix of covariates
that includes dichotomous variables identifying whether
respondent i had knowledge of facts pertaining to ballot measure
z and whether respondent i knows a gay or lesbian person. For a
summary of our research design, see Figure 1.
Figure 1: Research Design Summary
Positive
Assessment
of Cue-Giver

Genetic
Matching

Regression Analysis
of Endorsement
Effects

Negative
Assessment
of Cue-Giver

Genetic
Matching

Regression Analysis
of Endorsement
Effects

Full Sample

We fielded three surveys during the 2012 election cycle to
examine our hypotheses. The first survey asked voting-eligible
residents of North Carolina about Amendment 1, which appeared
on the May 8 presidential primary ballot. To collect our sample of
respondents, we hired Marketing Systems Group (MSG) to
recruit voting eligible North Carolina residents and forward
those individuals to our survey site.47 We received responses from
1066 individuals during the time we were in the field, and our
cooperation rate was 6%.48
On this survey, we asked our respondents to report what
they knew about Amendment 1, a legislatively-referred
constitutional amendment that would codify the already existing
statutory ban on same-sex marriage in the state’s constitution.49
47 Marketing Systems Group recruits respondents from their online opt-in panel.
Online opt-in panels are discussed at length in the literature concerning survey sampling;
we argue that most samples will be biased in some way. Additionally, since we are using a
quasi-experimental design, we minimize the problem of selection bias. However, Appendix A
contains the demographics for each sample compared to relevant U.S. census statistics.
48 Time in the field was from April 27 to May 3, 2012.
49 See North Carolina Same-Sex Marriage, Amendment 1 (May 2012), supra note 36.
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Many individuals voiced their support or opposition to the
measure. Of note, both President Barack Obama and
then-Governor Beverly Perdue expressed opposition to the
amendment. In addition to these two identification questions, we
also asked respondents to indicate whether they approved or
disapproved of President Obama’s and Governor Perdue’s job
performance (two separate questions). Finally, we asked
respondents to identify a piece of factual information regarding
Amendment 1: whether our respondents understood that
same-sex marriage was already prohibited in North Carolina.50
This question serves as a covariate in our regression model.
Our second survey asked registered voters in Minnesota
about Amendment 1, a legislatively-referred constitutional ban
on same-sex marriage that appeared on the 2012 general election
ballot.51 As before, we used MSG to provide a sample of
registered voters in Minnesota. We collected survey responses
from October 31 to November 5, receiving a total of 1250
responses. The cooperation rate was 7%.
On this survey, we asked respondents to report whether they
knew the positions of some of the most prominent third-party
endorsements relating to Minnesota’s Amendment 1. In
particular, we asked our respondents to identify the positions of
President Barack Obama (opposed), Governor Mark Dayton
(opposed), and Congresswoman Michele Bachmann (supported).
We also asked respondents to indicate whether respondents had
a positive or negative view of these cue-givers. For this measure,
we assessed respondents’ knowledge about three facts relating to
Amendment 1: (1) Amendment 1 left open the possibility for civil
unions; (2) same-sex marriages were already prohibited by the
state; and (3) the Minnesota Legislature had considered
proposing a similar measure previously. A full list of these
questions is available in Appendix B.
The third survey asked registered voters in Washington
state about Referendum 74, a veto referendum that proposed to
legalize same-sex marriage in the state on the November 6, 2012
general election ballot, where a yes vote constituted a vote to
approve same-sex marriage.52 For this sample, we again used
MSG and collected responses from registered voters in the state
from October 31 to November 5. We received responses from 1285
registered voters in Washington with a response rate of 7%.
See Appendix B.
The date of the general election ballot was November 6, 2012. See Minnesota
Same-Sex Marriage Amendment, Amendment 1 (2012), supra note 37.
52 See Washington Same-Sex Marriage Veto Referendum, Referendum 74 (2012),
supra note 39.
50
51

Do Not Delete

14

3/5/2016 11:30 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 19:1

Similar to questions regarding the Minnesota measure, we
asked respondents to identify the positions of three third-party
endorsements: Washington State Democrats (supported); Jeff
Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, a major employer in the state
(supported); and the National Organization for Marriage
(opposed). As was the case with the other measures, we asked
respondents to indicate whether they had a positive or negative
assessment of each cue-giver. In addition, we asked respondents
to report their knowledge of three facts pertaining to Referendum
74: (1) same-sex couples were not allowed to marry in
Washington state; (2) if passed, the majority of domestic
partnerships would convert to marriages; and (3) there was no
exemption for religious organizations who accepted state money
from being required to provide various services to same-sex
couples, such as adoption (but excluding marriages). Again, a full
description of each question is available in Appendix B.
For each of the three ballot measures, we also asked
respondents to indicate whether they knew a gay or lesbian
person. Specifically, we asked: “Do you have any friends or
relatives or coworkers who have told you, personally, that they
are gay or lesbian?” This variable is similar to our measures of
knowledge about the ballot measure, since it acts as a covariate
in our model. Additionally, including this measure allows us to
examine whether contact with a gay or lesbian person continues
to have an impact on vote choice. We turn now to present our
results.
III. RESULTS
The first step in our results is to present the percentage of
correct answers to each of the knowledge questions and the
distribution of responses for knowing a gay or lesbian person for
each of the three samples. As Table 1 shows, knowledge of cues
and facts varied across the three surveys. For North Carolina’s
Amendment 1, only 36.5% of respondents were aware of
President Obama’s opposition, and only 42.6% were aware of
then-Governor Perdue’s opposition to the measure. Notably,
72.2% of respondents knew the status quo, that same-sex
marriages were already illegal in the state. Lastly, just over 70%
of respondents reported having been informed personally by
someone close to them that he or she was a gay person or a
lesbian.
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Table 1: Percentage of Correct Responses to Endorsement and Factual
Knowledge Questions and Knowing a Gay or Lesbian Person
Question Description

Ballot Measure

% Correct

North Carolina
President Obama Opposed
(Cue)
Governor Beverly Perdue Opposed
(Cue)
NC Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage
Already (Fact)
Knows a Gay or Lesbian Person
(Covariate)

Amendment 1
(NC, 2012)
Amendment 1
(NC, 2012)
Amendment 1
(NC, 2012)
Amendment 1
(NC, 2012)

36.5

Minnesota
President Obama Opposed
(Cue)
Governor Mark Dayton Opposed
(Cue)
Representative Michele Bachmann
Supported (Cue)
MN Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage
Already (Fact)
Leaves Open Possibility of Civil
Unions (Fact)
Considered Similar Measure Before
(Fact)
Knows a Gay or Lesbian Person
(Covariate)

Amendment 1
(MN, 2012)
Amendment 1
(MN, 2012)
Amendment 1
(MN, 2012)
Amendment 1
(MN, 2012)
Amendment 1
(MN, 2012)
Amendment 1
(MN, 2012)
Amendment 1
(MN, 2012)

44.2

Washington
Washington State Democrats
(Cue)
Jeff Bezos Supported
(Cue)
National Organization for Marriage
(Cue)
WA Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage
Already (Fact)
Domestic Partnerships Convert to
Marriages (Fact)
No Exemption for Religious
Organizations (Fact)
Knows a Gay or Lesbian Person
(Covariate)

Referendum 74
(WA, 2012)
Referendum 74
(WA, 2012)
Referendum 74
(WA, 2012)
Referendum 74
(WA, 2012)
Referendum 74
(WA, 2012)
Referendum 74
(WA, 2012)
Referendum 74
(WA, 2012)

62.3

42.6
72.2
70.3

48.4
50.2
77.6
38.5
29.5
70.6

32.1
40.3
77.6
29
24.6
74.6

Note: We calculate the percentage of correct responses to these questions based on the respondents who
are eligible for regression analysis before matching. The sample sizes are as follows: North Carolina
N=561, Minnesota N=684, Washington N=700.

Regarding Minnesota’s Amendment 1, knowledge of the cues
we asked about varied from 44.2% for President Obama’s
opposition to 50.1% identifying Representative Michele
Bachmann’s support of the amendment, while 48.4% identified
Governor Dayton as an opponent. As was the case with North
Carolina, a large majority of respondents knew the status quo
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policy—that Minnesota law already prohibited same-sex
marriages.53 The two other facts in our survey did not fare as
well: only 38.5% understood that the legislation left open the
possibility of civil unions and just 29.5% were aware that the
Legislature had considered proposing a similar measure recently.
Almost identical to North Carolina, we find that 70.6% of
respondents have had someone close to them inform them
personally that he or she is a gay person or a lesbian.
For Washington, knowledge of cues also varies. A majority54
of respondents were aware of the Washington State Democrats’
support of Referendum 74,55 but only 32.1% were aware of
Amazon.com CEO Jeff Bezos’s support for the measure. Likewise,
40.3% of the Washington respondents knew that the National
Organization for Marriage opposed the measure. As before, the
status quo—that Washington did not allow same-sex couples to
marry—was widely known.56 Knowledge of other facts, however,
was quite low, with just 29% and 24.6% of respondents reporting
correctly that most domestic partnerships would convert to
marriages and that the law did not provide exemptions for
religious organizations to not be required to serve same-sex
couples (with the exception of marriage ceremonies), respectively.
As was the case in both North Carolina and Minnesota, a large
majority of respondents report having a close relative or friend
who identifies himself or herself as a gay person or lesbian.57
Next, we turn to analyze whether knowledge of cues have an
impact on individuals’ decisions on ballot measures that consider
same-sex marriage as a policy outcome. First, we present the
results of our matching algorithm. While the full output
associated with our matching results is far too large to publish,
we present the overall improvement in propensity scores
achieved through our genetic matching algorithm in Table 2. The
first column of the table reports the difference in means for the
propensity to receive the treatment between the treatment and
control groups. That is, column one is the pre-matching mean
propensity of the treatment minus the pre-matching mean
propensity of the control group. The second column is the same
comparison in mean propensity scores post matching. The third
column is a calculation of the percent of propensity score
improvement.

53
54
55
56
57

77.6% correct. See supra Table 1.
62.3%. See id.
Referendum 74 legalizes same-sex marriage. See id.
77.6 % correct. See id.
74.6%. See id.
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Table 2: Propensity Score Balance Before and
After Genetic Matching
Matched Treatment
Condition
NC Amendment 1,
Approve Obama
NC Amendment 1,
Disapprove Obama
NC Amendment 1,
Approve Perdue
NC Amendment 1,
Disapprove Perdue
MN Amendment 1,
Negative Opinion Bachmann
MN Amendment 1,
Approve Obama
MN Amendment 1,
Disapprove Obama
MN Amendment 1,
Approve Dayton
MN Amendment 1,
Disapprove Dayton
WA Referendum 74,
Positive Opinion Bezos
WA Referendum 74,
Positive Opinion WA Dems.
WA Referendum 74,
Negative Opinion WA Dems.
WA Referendum 74,
Negative Opinion N.O.M.

Mean
Propensity
Difference Pre

Mean
Propensity
Difference Post

Percent
Improvement

0.058

0.002

97.2

0.068

0.000

95.7

0.171

0.005

97.0

0.065

0.004

94.2

0.219

0.003

98.8

0.139

0.001

99.3

0.133

0.000

99.8

0.275

0.012

95.7

0.290

0.006

97.9

0.134

0.003

98.0

0.120

0.005

95.5

0.199

0.003

98.6

0.358

0.018

95.7

As Table 2 shows, each of the subgroups we matched saw a
marked improvement in propensity score balance between the
treatment and control groups. As an example, consider the
improvement in North Carolina’s Amendment 1 for individuals
who gave a positive job evaluation to President Obama. Before
matching, respondents who received the treatment—i.e., they
were aware that President Obama opposed the amendment—
were 5.8 percentage points more likely to receive the treatment
based on the matching algorithm we used.58 After matching, the
difference in propensity to receive the treatment between the
treatment and control group dropped to 0.2 percentage points. In
fact, this subgroup saw a 97.2% increase in propensity score
balance between the treatment and control group after matching.
While we refrain from discussing each of the propensity score
improvements for each subgroup, it is worth noting that each
subgroup experienced a substantial increase in propensity

58

See supra Part II for details on the algorithm.
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balance after matching (the lowest improvement was 94%).
Overall, Table 2 shows that our genetic matching algorithm
produced a treatment group and control group that are directly
comparable.
With comparable groups, we calculate a series of regressions
based on Equation 1. After each regression, we calculate some
predicted probabilities of interest using Long and Freese’s SPost
program (SPost is a program in Stata that easily calculates
quantities of interest based on regression results 2005).59 Table 3
presents the regression results for our matched samples of
respondents who either approved or disapproved of President
Obama’s job performance. For respondents who approved of his
job performance, knowledge of President Obama’s opposition led
individuals to vote against the measure at a higher rate—that is,
they appeared to follow the advice of his endorsement. For
respondents who disapproved of his job performance, knowledge
of Obama’s opposition to the measure led them to do the opposite
of his recommendation. In both cases, then, the treatment had a
significant effect in the predicted direction. Notably, respondents
in both subgroups who knew a gay or lesbian person were
significantly less likely to support the measure.
Table 3: Logit Regression Results of President Obama’s
Endorsement on North Carolina’s Amendment 1
Approve Obama

Disapprove Obama

Knows Obama Opposed

-0.94*
0.62*
(0.41)
(0.27)
SSM Prohibited
-0.08
0.07
(0.48)
(0.28)
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person
-1.63***
-1.11***
(0.43)
(0.31)
Constant
0.65
0.83*
(0.57)
(0.35)
Pseudo-R2
.122
.057
N
172
294
Note: Dependent variable is support for North Carolina’s same-sex marriage ban
(Amendment 1 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities for the
regressions in Table 3. Holding the factual knowledge variable at
its mean effect,60 we calculate four quantities of interest for
North Carolina’s Amendment 1. What these probabilities show is

59 See generally J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR
CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA (3d ed. 2014).
60 For all calculations of predicted probabilities, we hold the effects of factual
knowledge at their mean values.
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that knowledge of Obama’s opposition produced a 23 percentage
point drop in support for the amendment among individuals who
approve of his job performance; knowing both a gay or lesbian
person and the cue lead to an additional decline of 29.2
percentage points. Interestingly, just knowing a gay person or
lesbian and not knowing the cue produces a voting rate that is
statistically indistinguishable from respondents who approve of
Obama’s job performance. For respondents who disapprove of
Obama, patterns are similar: knowledge of the cue leads to an
increase in support for the amendment, but knowing a gay or
lesbian person leads to a substantial decline in support.
Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of President Obama’s Endorsement
on North Carolina’s Amendment 1 (2012)

Approve Obama

Disapprove Obama

Turning now to examine the effect of Governor Perdue’s
opposition to the amendment, Table 4 reports that her
endorsement only had an effect on individuals who disapproved
of her job performance. That is, individuals who disapproved of
her job performance as Governor but knew she opposed
Amendment 1 were more likely to support the measure as a
result. Governor Perdue’s endorsement did not have a significant
effect on respondents who approved of her job performance, but
the effect was in the expected direction. In both regressions, we
again see a significant decline in support for the amendment
among respondents who know a gay or lesbian friend or relative.
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Table 4: Logit Regression Results of Governor Perdue’s
Endorsement on North Carolina’s Amendment 1
Approve Perdue

Disapprove Perdue

Knows Perdue Opposed

-0.24
0.63*
(0.46)
(0.28)
SSM Prohibited
1.00
0.22
(0.55)
(0.29)
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person
-1.00*
-1.07***
(0.51)
(0.31)
Constant
-0.69
0.43
(0.63)
(0.34)
Pseudo-R2
.05
.055
N
128
287
Note: Dependent variable is support for North Carolina’s same-sex marriage ban
(Amendment 1 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The predicted probabilities relevant for Governor Perdue,
presented in Figure 3, highlight the effect of both the
endorsement and knowing a gay or lesbian person. While
knowledge of her endorsement had no discernable effect on
respondents who approved of her job performance, knowing a gay
person or lesbian leads to a decline in support for the measure by
about 22 percentage points. For respondents who disapprove of
her job performance, knowledge of her endorsement increases
support for the measure by 13 percentage points, but knowing a
gay person or lesbian decreases support for the measure by 23.5
percentage points for individuals who know the cue and 26.1
percentage points for those who do not.
Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Governor Perdue’s Endorsement
on North Carolina’s Amendment 1 (2012)

Approve Perdue

Disapprove Perdue
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We begin our analysis of Minnesota’s Amendment 1 by
examining the effect of Representative Bachmann’s support for
the measure. Unfortunately, there were not enough respondents
who reported a positive opinion of the Representative to analyze
whether her endorsement had an effect on those respondents.
Instead, Table 5 reports the regression results for just
individuals who have a negative opinion of Representative
Bachmann. The regression shows clearly that knowing that
Representative Bachmann supported the measure was helpful
for this subgroup as they were less likely to support the
amendment. Interestingly, knowing that the law left open the
possibility of civil unions led to an increase in support for the
measure. Unlike North Carolina, however, knowing a gay or
lesbian friend or relative did not have a substantial effect on this
subgroup. The predicted probabilities associated with this
regression, available in Figure 4, show that the effect of knowing
her endorsement led to a substantial drop in support for the
amendment of at least 16 percentage points.
Table 5: Logit Regression Results of Representative Bachmann’s
Endorsement on Minnesota’s Amendment 1
Negative Opinion of Bachmann
Bachmann Supported

-1.17***
(0.35)
Civil Unions Possible
1.04**
(0.35)
SSM Prohibited
0.36
(0.39)
Considered Ban Previously
-0.81
(0.42)
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person
-0.54
(0.35)
Constant
-0.84
(0.44)
Pseudo-R2
.107
N
378
Note: Dependent variable is support for Minnesota’s same-sex marriage ban (Amendment
1 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of Representative Bachmann’s
Endorsement on Minnesota’s Amendment 1 (2012)

Table 6 contains the regression results for President
Obama’s endorsement. Unlike North Carolina, President
Obama’s opposition to Minnesota’s Amendment 1 only had an
effect on respondents who disapproved of the President’s job
performance: respondents aware of this cue were significantly
more likely to support the measure, as our second hypothesis
predicts. As was the case with Representative Bachmann,
knowing a gay or lesbian friend or relative has no discernable
Table 6: Logit Regression Results of President Obama’s
Endorsement on Minnesota’s Amendment 1
Approve Obama
Obama Opposed

Disapprove Obama

-0.07
1.33***
(0.36)
(0.35)
Civil Unions Possible
0.50
-0.21
(0.37)
(0.34)
SSM Prohibited
-0.02
-0.63
(0.42)
(0.46)
Considered Ban Previously
0.12
0.28
(0.38)
(0.45)
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person
-0.55
-0.25
(0.40)
(0.35)
Constant
-1.80***
1.25*
(0.51)
(0.53)
Pseudo-R2
.017
.077
N
300
310
Note: Dependent variable is support for Minnesota’s same-sex marriage ban (Amendment
1 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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effect on our respondents in either subgroup. Figure 5, which
presents the predicted probabilities, shows that there is
essentially no difference in voting rates among respondents who
approve of the President’s job performance. For respondents who
disapprove of his job performance, however, knowing his
endorsement leads to at least a 21.2 percentage point increase in
support for the measure.
Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities of President Obama’s Endorsement
on Minnesota’s Amendment 1 (2012)

Table 7 presents the regression results related to Governor
Dayton’s endorsement. The results for Governor Dayton are the
exact opposite of President Obama’s: individuals who approve of
Governor Dayton’s job performance and knew of his opposition to
the measure were significantly less likely to support Amendment 1.
Also, similar to the results for Representative Bachmann,
respondents in this subgroup who knew that the measure left
open the possibility of civil unions were more likely to support
the measure. By contrast, there were no significant results for
respondents who disapproved of Governor Dayton’s job
performance. Identical to the previous two sets of regression
results, knowing a gay person or lesbian had no effect on vote
intention for Minnesota’s Amendment 1. The predicted
probabilities we generate from this regression, available in
Figure 6, show that knowledge of the cue among respondents
who approve of Governor Dayton’s job performance lead to at
least a 12.6 percentage point drop in support for the measure.
There were no meaningful quantities of interest for respondents
who disapproved of Governor Dayton’s job performance.
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Table 7: Logit Regression Results of Governor Dayton’s
Endorsement on Minnesota’s Amendment 1
Approve Dayton
Dayton Opposed
Civil Unions Possible
SSM Prohibited
Considered Ban Previously
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person
Constant

-0.85*
(0.37)
0.87*
(0.34)
0.42
(0.42)
0.22
(0.35)
-0.19
(0.37)
-1.56***
(0.47)

Disapprove Dayton
0.66
(0.47)
0.37
(0.42)
-0.02
(0.52)
0.30
(0.44)
-0.89
(0.57)
1.44*
(0.62)

Pseudo-R2
N

.053
.053
303
177
Note: Dependent variable is support for Minnesota’s same-sex marriage ban (Amendment
1 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities of Governor Dayton’s Endorsement
on Minnesota’s Amendment 1 (2012)

The final measure we surveyed about is Washington’s
Referendum 74. First, we examine the effect of Jeff Bezos’
support of the referendum. The regression results for individuals
who have a positive opinion of Bezos are available in Table 8.61

61 There were not enough respondents who had a negative opinion of Bezos to run a
regression.
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The results show that Jeff Bezos had no effect on vote intention.
This is perhaps expected, as Bezos is not a policy expert. The
predicted probabilities in Figure 7 reflect the null results seen in
Table 8.
Table 8: Logit Regression Results of Jeff Bezos’s Endorsement on
Washington’s Referendum 74
Positive Opinion of Bezos
Bezos Supported

0.14
(0.38)
SSM Prohibited
0.15
(0.44)
Civil Unions Convert
-0.49
(0.38)
No Religious Exemptions
-0.28
(0.46)
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person
0.80
(0.42)
Constant
0.81
(0.59)
Pseudo-R2
.03
N
210
Note: Dependent variable is support for Washington’s legalization of same-sex marriages
(Referendum 74 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities of Jeff Bezos’s Endorsement on
Washington’s Referendum 74 (2012)
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Next, we examine the effect of the Washington State
Democrats’ endorsement on individuals’ vote choice. As Table 9
shows, the effect of their support for the referendum was
statistically indistinguishable for both respondents who have a
positive or negative opinion of the party. That is, the treatment of
an endorsement from the Washington State Democrats has no
effect on respondents’ intended vote choice. For respondents with
a positive view of the Washington State Democrats, knowing a
gay or lesbian relative or friend had a significant and positive
effect on voting for the referendum (i.e., supporting same-sex
marriage). For those who have a negative view, knowing that the
referendum did not provide exemptions for religious
organizations for activities other than marriage led to a
significant and negative effect on support for the measure. For
the predicted probabilities in Figure 8, the only interesting
calculation is that knowing a gay person or lesbian increases
support for the referendum by about 12.6 percentage points for
respondents who have a positive opinion of the Washington State
Democrats.
Table 9: Logit Regression Results of Washington State Democrats
Endorsement on Washington’s Referendum 74
Positive Opinion of
WA Democrats
WA Democrats Supported

Negative Opinion of
WA Democrats

0.83
-0.58
(0.45)
(0.45)
SSM Prohibited
0.22
-0.01
(0.44)
(0.43)
Civil Unions Convert
-0.44
-0.37
(0.40)
(0.42)
No Religious Exemptions
-0.25
-1.47*
(0.44)
(0.72)
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person
1.22**
0.56
(0.41)
(0.44)
Constant
0.62
-1.17*
(0.45)
(0.50)
Pseudo-R2
.071
.066
N
324
245
Note: Dependent variable is support for Washington’s legalization of same-sex marriages
(Referendum 74 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figure 8: Predicted Probabilities of Washington State Democrats’
Endorsement on Washington’s Referendum 74 (2012)

Finally, we present the results related to the National
Organization for Marriage’s endorsement. While there were not
enough respondents who had a positive view of the organization
to run a regression, the results for respondents who had a
negative opinion of the group are available in Table 10. Unlike
the previous two endorsements that had no effect, individuals
who were both aware of the National Organization for Marriage’s
opposition to Referendum 74 and held a negative view of the
group were significantly more likely to vote for the referendum.
This result supports our second hypothesis. Also of note,
individuals who knew a gay person or lesbian were significantly
more likely to support the measure. The predicted probabilities,
presented in Figure 9, are impressive as well: knowledge of the
endorsement leads to a 57.8 percentage point increase in support,
and knowing a gay person or lesbian increased that support by
an additional 17.6 percentage points. In fact, just knowing a gay
or lesbian friend or relative increases the probability of
supporting the measure by 51.2 percentage points.
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Table 10: Logit Regression Results of National Organization for
Marriage’s Endorsement on Washington’s Referendum 74
Negative Opinion of the National
Organization for Marriage
National Organization for Marriage Opposed
2.64***
(0.73)
SSM Prohibited
-0.96
(0.78)
Civil Unions Convert
1.01
(0.67)
No Religious Exemptions
-0.90
(0.70)
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person
2.27***
(0.63)
Constant
-0.58
(0.77)
Pseudo-R2
.271
N
204
Note: Dependent variable is support for Washington’s legalization of same-sex marriages
(Referendum 74 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 9: Predicted Probabilities of the National Organization for
Marriage’s Endorsement on Washington’s Referendum 74 (2012)

CONCLUSION
We analyzed whether cues from prominent third-party
endorsers have an effect on individuals’ decisions on ballot
measures related to same-sex marriage. Using the largest
database of individual-level data collected on the topic to date, we
used genetic matching to examine the hypothesis that knowledge
of cues leads to improved decision making. We found that
knowledge of a cue only sometimes influences individuals’
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decisions: a cue was effective in seven of our thirteen cases. This
result reinforces our interpretation that cues are influential some
of the time for some voters. Indeed, there are substantial swaths
of the electorate—i.e., those who do not have firm opinions of the
cue-givers we analyzed—who are absent from our analysis. We
also showed that knowing a gay or lesbian person sometimes has
a substantial impact on an individual’s voting behavior.
Similar to our previous research, we find that knowledge of a
policy’s specifics has a very limited impact on individuals’
decisions. In only a few of our regressions did we find that
knowledge of facts had an effect on vote choice. What we can
conclude, however, is that knowledge of the status quo policy—
that same-sex couples were prohibited from marrying in all three
states—never had an effect on an individual’s assessment of the
ballot measure being considered. While our expectation is that
knowledge of facts should influence individuals’ decisions, after
numerous explorations of this hypothesis in this Article and in
our previous research, we can only conclude that, when compared
with cues, factual information has an even more limited effect on
individuals’ decisions.62
Examining an easy issue for voters to understand and make
decisions leaves open the possibility that individuals simply do
not need a cue to make a choice and, as a result, we should read
our results as signs of encouragement that voters are making
competent choices. We argue, however, that this is not what our
results suggest. Overall, our results imply that scholars and the
legal community should not assume that individuals use elite
endorsements to inform their decisions at a high rate.
Furthermore, we also find that knowledge of cues and facts is
often quite low. Even though we examine an easy issue in
same-sex marriage, our results here mimic the results in
previous research, where we examine both easy and hard
issues.63 In other words, we argue that our results are beginning
to provide convergent validity to our conclusion that individuals
simply do not use information from the campaign environment at
a high rate.
Our findings have several notable implications relevant to
both legal scholars and practitioners. First, interpreting the will
of the electorate may be more difficult than some might
commonly assume. We show that knowledge of most ballot

62 Burnett et al., Dilemma of Direct Democracy, supra note 7, at 305–16; Burnett
& McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4, at 3, 5.
63 Burnett & McCubbins, Voters’ Limited Use of Endorsements, supra note 7, at
1587–94.
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measures is often quite low, demonstrating that most individuals
are unaware of a measure’s specific attributes. If voters do not
know a policy’s specifics, the courts are left with the unenviable
task of guessing what the average voter knew when casting her
choice. Additionally, we found that voters often knew little about
the relevant endorsements. These endorsers are often the
individuals who must explicate the logic behind supporting or
opposing a specific policy. Thus, when voters are unaware of
these endorsements, it raises concerns about turning to the
actual supporting and opposing campaigns for guidance on
interpreting what the voters’ intent was—which is a natural
place for the courts to look, as these groups often compose at
least one of the belligerents in a legal contest.
Second, our results imply that the legal community and
policymakers should be concerned about the kinds of questions
that appear on the ballot. Moreover, in states similar to
Washington that pose multiple ballot questions per cycle
(e.g., California and Oregon), there should be some additional
concern about the length of the ballot. In addition to the decades
of research showing that voters lack basic foundational
knowledge about politics, our findings show that knowledge of
ballot measures is also quite low. As Downs argues, we suspect
that most voters are simply too busy to spend the time and
resources to acquire a deep understanding of the political world,
let alone facts about ballot measures that will appear during the
next election.64 Whereas Downs was less concerned about voter
knowledge because cues, such as party labels, could convey
immense amounts of information and substitute for knowledge,
we show that knowledge of these cues is low—a problem that
only compounds because cues are not available on the ballot
directly in direct democracy contests, unlike many candidate
contests. While some policies are largely symbolic and
ends- rather than means-focused, and likely not difficult for most
voters to cast a competent vote, many issues are complex and
legally complicated propositions that require more than a “gut
response” to make a reasoned decision.65 When ballots ask voters
to consider these complicated policies, democracy is likely asking
too much from the average voter. In some states, the number of
complicated policies the voter must consider is astoundingly
large. Policymakers and the legal community should begin
thinking about how to institute controls and regulations that
address these larger democratic concerns.
DOWNS, supra note 17, at 44–46.
Carmines & Stimson, supra note 11, at 78, 80 (referencing the prototypical “easy
issues”).
64
65
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Third, our findings show that the political landscape of direct
democracy is one that is particularly susceptible to elite
manipulation. With most voters knowing little about the ballot
measures they consider on Election Day, it should be no surprise
that political elites can shape the way in which the law is
implemented, which is often contrary to the intent of the law.66
In other words, when representative democracy interferes with
the outcomes of direct democracy, voters are at an
insurmountable disadvantage concerning their ability to monitor
and enforce the outcomes of direct democracy.
Elite interference may also begin well before Election Day.
The results we present here, in conjunction with our previous
research on the topic, show that voters know little about many
kinds of ballot measures. This means that voters may rely
disproportionately on the information that appears on the
ballot—namely, the title and summary. With few exceptions,
these titles and descriptions are written by a politically
motivated figure.67 Indeed, it is commonplace to see several
challenges to the proposed titles and summaries of ballot
measures every election cycle, most claiming that the verbiage
encourages a particular outcome through biased language. As
Burnett and Kogan show, this kind of elite manipulation can be
impressively effective with just a few word changes, even on
“easy issues” such as same-sex marriage.68 To date, however, the
task of writing these potentially manipulated titles and
summaries remains largely in the hands of politically motivated
individuals, and the courts consider challenges on a case-by-case
basis.
While the three issues we just outlined are important policy
concerns, there may be no single solution to creating a better
direct democracy framework. What is clear, however, is that
direct democracy asks much from the average voter, but provides
little in the way of informing voters about the potential impact of
their choice in a way that is useful to them. To be sure, some
measures have active campaigns that attempt to inform (albeit
selectively) voters about their choices. In other cases, official
66 Previous research has documented that elected officials often fail to implement or
only partially implement laws passed through direct democracy when it is not in their
best interest. See Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone
Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 653,
661–62 (2000).
67 For example, this could be an attorney general or the measure’s proponents.
68 Craig M. Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, When Does Ballot Language Influence Voter
Choices? Evidence from a Survey Experiment, 32 POL. COMM. 109, 109–11 (2015)
(demonstrating, using experimental evidence, that elites may easily manipulate voters
with very slight changes in titles and descriptions).
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election literature outlines the issue at hand. But, most voters
are busy, and largely unconcerned with their choices on Election
Day beyond the top of the ballot contests (e.g., presidency,
governorship). Several rounds of surveying individuals
concerning what they know about direct democracy has only
emphasized the veracity of this observation.
One potential enhancement to the institution of direct
democracy from the voter’s-eye-view is to improve the
information environment on the ballot. Most voters appear to
know little about the measures they are considering, and most
measures are not as easy as a social policy choice such as samesex marriage. Thus, policymakers should endeavor to consider
ways to improve the kinds of information that are available to
voters at the point-of-decision (i.e., on the official ballot). As
Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins proposed in “The Dilemma of
Direct Democracy,” we argue that endorsements on the actual
ballot would be helpful to many voters.69 The challenge, however,
is constructing a framework to select the endorsements that
should be included and which ones should be excluded. Other
kinds of information that would help improve decision making in
direct democracy include, but are not limited to: clearly outlining
the impact of a yes versus a no vote, longer descriptions of the
measures, and the potential financial impact of a yes or no
outcome (California already includes this information). While we
cannot fully assess the feasibility or impact of any, or all, of these
measures with the data we have, we suspect some of these
additional pieces of information would drastically improve the
quality of decisions in direct democracy elections for the average
voter.

69

Burnett et al., Dilemma of Direct Democracy, supra note 7, at 317–24.
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Appendix A
North Carolina Demographics
Survey

2011 Census
Estimates

39.9
$25,001–$50,000

37.7
$45,570

% High School Graduates, Age > 25

97.9

83.6

% Female

76.6

51.3

% White (Not Hispanic)

80.2

65

% Black

12.6

22

% Latino/Hispanic

2.2

8.6

% Asian

2.2

2.3

Age (Median)
Income (Median)

Minnesota Demographics

49
$50,001–$75,000

2012 Census
Estimates
36.9
$58,476

% High School Graduates, Age > 25

98.8

91.6

% Female

63.4

50.3

% White (Not Hispanic)

94

82.4

% Black

1.1

5.5

% Latino/Hispanic

0.9

4.9

% Asian

2.2

4.4

Survey
Age (Median)
Income (Median)

Washington Demographics

49
$50,001–$75,000

2012 Census
Estimates
37.3
$58,890

% High School Graduates, Age > 25

98.3

89.8

% Female

64.7

50.1

% White (Not Hispanic)

87.3

71.6

% Black

1.7

3.9

% Latino/Hispanic

2.1

11.7

% Asian

5.4

7.7

Survey
Age (Median)
Income (Median)
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Appendix B
North Carolina
Amendment 1
1. Do you happen to know if President Barack Obama supported,
opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1?
2. Do you happen to know if Governor Beverly Perdue supported,
opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1?
3. To the best of your knowledge, do you know if North Carolina
law currently prohibits same-sex marriage?
Minnesota
Amendment 1
1. Do you happen to know if President Barack Obama supported,
opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1?
2. Do you happen to know if Governor Mark Dayton supported,
opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1?
3. Do you happen to know if Representative Michele Bachmann
supported, opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1?
4. To the best of your knowledge, does Amendment 1 leave open
the possibility of civil unions between same-sex couples?
5. To the best of your knowledge, do you know if Minnesota law
currently prohibits same-sex marriage?
6. Do you happen to know if the Minnesota state legislature has
considered constitutional amendments to outlaw same-sex
marriage before the current proposal?
Washington
Referendum Measure No. 74
1. Do you happen to know if Mark Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com,
supported, opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1?
2. Do you happen to know if the Washington State Democrats
supported, opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1?
3. Do you happen to know if the National Organization for
Marriage supported, opposed, or took no position on
Amendment 1?
4. To the best of your knowledge, as of today, do you know if samesex couples are allowed to marry in Washington State?
5. If Referendum Measure No. 74 is confirmed—that is, voters
support the referendum—do you happen to know what will
happen to the majority of current domestic partnerships in the
state?
6. Do you happen to know if confirming Referendum 74 will
require religious organizations that receive state funding to
recognize and serve same-sex couples seeking to adopt a child or
become foster parents?

